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Summary  findings
Compared with other urban water systems  in West  because reform was based on a system already
Africa, the water supply system in Abidjan performs very  performing well, the contractual arrangement with a
well. Documenting the recent history of that system,  private operator  proved exceptionally capable of
Menard and Clarke try to answer three questions: What  adjusting even in the face of dramatic changes in the
motivated reform in a system that was already  external environment.
performing well? How and why did the reform affect  Institutional environments are not as favorable in other
sector performance, and what additional changes might  countries in the region, so similar contractual
improve performance further? And what explains the  arrangements might be less successful elsewhere.
relatively strong performance of Abidjan's water system?  Reform in C6te d'Ivoire was motivated primarily by a
Is the success attributable primarily to an efficient  macroecoinomic  crisis, which reduced the resources
contractual arrangement or more generally to C6te  available for public investment. Without either a sector
d'Ivoire's institutional environment?  crisis or a realignment of political forces, the will for
In a region plagued by political instability, Ivoirian  reform was weak. Consequently, opportunities for
political institutions were remarkably stable for close to  improvement were missed and some problems remain.
40 years. In part, the success of the Ivoirian model is the  Among other ways in which the system could be
result of these institutions'  stability and credibility.  improved: Splitting the water system into autonomous
The single-party system in place at the time of reform  subsystems for different cities, and allowing bidding for
might suggest that there were few restraints in place to  investment contracts, would increase the chances of
prevent the government from behaving opportunistically.  competition for investment, which does not currently
But several features of the institutional environment  exist.
protected against such opportunism. Because of this, and
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Especially when compared to other urban water systems in West Africa, the water supply
system in Abidjan performs very well.  For over thirty years, despite rapid population
growth, there  has  been  enough  investment to  cover basic  needs  and,  consequently,
coverage is good by regional standards.  Prices, although high compared to countries in
Latin America and Asia, are lower than in many neighboring African countries and have
been declining in real terms.'  The strong commercial performance of the operator in
Abidjan has produced sufficient revenue to subsidize the expansion and development of
urban water systems throughout the country.  Further, the stable contractual arrangement
between the government and the private operator, SODECI, has proven adaptable enough
to  survive several adjustments and crises.  All stakeholders-private  users, government
officials,  international  organizations  and  the  private  operator-agree,  with  few
reservations, that the arrangement has worked well.  Consequently, the model has been
imitated throughout Africa and other regions of the World, although the results have
sometimes  been more mixed than they have been in CMte  d'Lvoire.
This paper documents the recent history of the water system in Abidjan, focusing
on the latest reform to the contractual arrangement in  1988.  We focus on three main
questions:  (1) What motivated reform in a system that was already performing well?  (2)
How,  and why, did the reform affect sector performance and what additional changes
might improve performance further? (3) What explains the relatively strong performance
of  Abidjan's  water  system-is  the  success primarily due  to  an  efficient contractual
arrangement or is it due to more general characteristics  of the institutional environment in
rote  d'Ivoire?  Given that the Ivoirian model is being transplanted to  other countries,
understanding the reasons for its strong performance will allow us to anticipate the likely
benefits and limitations of the arrangement  in other developing countries.
The primary motivation for reform was a macroeconomic  crisis, which reduced the
budgetary resources  available for public  investrnent.  This  made  it  difficult for  the
government agencies responsible for investrnent to increase system capacity fast enough to
serve the city's rapidly expanding  population. However,  the crisis did not lead to a change
in the government's support base nor did it have a dramatic impact on service quality for
' Menard  and Shirley  (2000)  compares  prices  in six  African  and  Latin  American  countries  and  World
Bank  (1999)  compares  prices  in Cote  d'Ivoire  to prices  in some  Asian  Cities. World  Bank  (1999)  notes  that
prices  in COte  d'Ivoire  are similar  to those  Asian  countries  where  service  quality  is high. Menard  and  Clarke
(2000)  shows  that  in  the mid-1990s,  prices  were lower  in Abidjan  than  in many  other  African  countries.
2 For  example,  a similar,  but not identical,  arrangement  in Guinea,  while  proving  to be a major
improvement  over  the previous  system  where  a public  enterprise  was  responsible  for operation,  maintenance
and investment  was less  successful  than  the arrangement  in Cote  d'Ivoire  (see  Menard  and Clarke,  2000).
2existing  customers and,  therefore, there was  little  support  for  a  major  restructuring.
Consequently, the  crisis  led  to  only  a  minor  reform  that  shifted  responsibility  for
investment from the  government budget to  sector resources  and increased the private
operator's responsibilities. This provides counterfactual evidence that supports one of the
central hypotheses of the project: in the absence of a sector crisis or  a realignment of
political forces, the desirability of reform is weak and, therefore, reform will tend to be
limited.
As the paper shows, the reform was quite successful. Most performance indicators
appear to have improved or stayed the same, tariffs have fallen, and all parties to  the
agreement appear satisfied with system performance.  Most notably, despite a drop in
investment expenditures, the private operator managed to reverse a  downward trend in
coverage levels in Abidjan and to maintain service quality.  However, the modest nature of
the reform meant that some opportunities for improvement were missed and that some
problems remain, calling into question the continued viability of the arrangement.  The
paper discusses the challenges facing the system in the near future and speculates about
steps that might further improve sector  performance.
Finally, the paper tries to explain the success and limitations of the contractual
arrangement  by  looking  at  the  interaction  between  specific  characteristics  of  the
institutional environment in Cote d'Ivoire and the design of the contract. Notwithstanding
events at the end of 1999, in a region of the world plagued by political instability, Ivoirian
political institutions have been remarkably stable for close to 40 years.  In part, the success
of  the Ivoirian model is the result of the stability and credibility of these institutions.
Although the single party system in place at the time of reform might suggest that there
were few restraints that would prevent the government from behaving opportunistically,
several features of the institutional environment, discussed in detail in the next section,
protected against this.  Because of this, and because the reform was based on a system that
was  already performing well, the contractual arrangement proved to  have  exceptional
capacity to adjust even when faced with dramatic changes in the external environment.
This allowed the government to maintain confidence in the system and to guarantee the
safeguards  protecting  the  private  operator  during  the  reform  process,  ensuring  the
feasibility and sustainability of reform.  Because the institutional environments of most
other countries in the region are not as favorable as in Cote d'Ivoire, similar contractual
arrangements might be less successful when copied in these countries.
The next section of the paper (Section II) will analyze the working conditions of the
water supply system in Abidjan prior to reform.  In Section III, the paper describes the
institutional environment in Cote d'Ivoire, while Section IV discusses the macroeconomic
crisis that motivated reform and the effect that this had on the government's support base
and  the  water  sector.  Section V  examines the reform  itself.  It  discusses changes
3introduced  in  the  preexisting  governance structure, characteristics of  the  contractual
arrangement adopted in  1988, and modalities of its  implementation.  The next section
(Section VI) summarizes the effect that reform had on sector performance and the reasons
for the changes.  Section VII discusses difficulties to overcome and lessons that can be
learned from the Abidjan case and section VIII concludes.
II  A Continuing  Private  Sector  Participation
Even before the 1988 reform, sector performance in Abidjan was impressive by
regional standards.  Access to potable water was very high, almost all connections were
both metered and billed, and private customers routinely paid their bills.  Further, piped
water was drinkable and service interruptions were infrequent. In this section of the paper,
we discuss sector organization and performance before reform.  The success of Abidjan's
water supply system  supports the view that  a  combination of  stable and well-defined
institutional rules and an appropriately  designed contract determines success.
II.1  Sector Organization before Reform
Private participation in urban water supply is a well-established tradition in C6te
d'Ivoire, especially in Abidjan. A private enterprise, the Societe de Distribution d'Eau de
C6te d'Ivoire  (SODECI), has been responsible for  operation and maintenance of  the
Abidjan water system since before independence and has been responsible for operation
and maintenance of all urban water systems in C6te d'Ivoire since 1974.  Although its
responsibilities have changed several times, its  continuing presence  demonstrates the
feasibility of private sector participation  in C6te d'Ivoire's urban water sector.
Partners and responsibilities. Until 1956, most water systems were managed by
local public agencies under the supervision of city councils.  Because the systems were
often operated inefficiently and were in need of significant investment, some municipal
governments turned  to  the  private  sector.  In  1959, before  Cote  d'Ivoire  became
independent, an international tender for a concession contract to supply water in Abidjan
was launched (SODECI, 1996a). A French company, SAUR, which was already active in
West Africa, won the tender.  However, since as a condition of the contract, the private
operator had to be subject to Ivoirian laws and be majority-owned  by Ivoirian shareholders,
a new enterprise, SODECI, with SAUR as the main shareholder, was formed. 3 The thirty-
year concession contract that the city government signed with  SODECI made SODECI
SAUR  was the largest  shareholder  (46%),  but individual  Ivoirian  investors  owned  45% of the company
and  the Ivoirian  government  held  a 5%  share  through  a Government  finance  company.  The  remaining  4%
were held  by individual  French  investors  at  that time  (World  Bank, 1977).
4responsible for operation, maintenance and investment in Abidjan (World Bank,  1977).4
Over  the  next  few  years,  SODECI  signed  five  additional lease  contracts  and  three
additional management  contracts in  other  municipalities in  CMte d'Ivoire  (SODECI,
1996a).
In 1967, SODECI's role in Abidjan was significantly reduced when responsibility
for most investment was passed to the government, making the contract into a management
contract with SODECI responsible for operation and maintenance of the system. 5 SODECI
also continued to implement significant investment on behalf of the Ivoirian government.
In 1974, SODECI's success in Abidjan encouraged the government to  award SODECI a
fifteen-year contract for the operation and maintenance of urban water systems in all other
Ivoirian cities. 6 The government did this to improve sector performance outside of Abidjan
and to equalize tariffs in urban areas. Since costs in Abidjan were considerably lower than
in other areas, Abidjan ended up subsidizing urban water supply in secondary cities.
At this time, responsibility for the sector management was transferred to the central
government and, from then on, local authorities played only a minor role in the sector.  A
government  agency,  the  Direction  de  1'Eau (known  as  the  Direction  Centrale  de
1'Hydraulique until  1984) retained ownership of  sector assets, managed and  planned
investment and monitored the contract with SODECI. 7 After January 1976, sector finances
were managed by an autonomous agency, the Fonds National de l'Hydraulique  (FNH)
located in the Caisse Autonome d'Amortissement (CAA).  The FNH received part of the
water tariff to service sector debt and could borrow to finance investment.
SODECI has thus been an active participant in Abidjan's water supply system for
over 40 years.  Indeed, no other enterprise, private or public, has been involved in the
operation and maintenance of any of the urban water systems in C6te d'Ivoire since 1974.
SODECI has also played a limited role in the sewerage system, although operation and
maintenance of the sewerage system has never been included in the contracts for urban
water supply.
4 At  the  end  of the  contract,  the  assets  reverted  to the  government.
5  SODECI  remained  responsible  for renewal  of electromechanical  equipment  for  Abidjan's  boreholes
(World  Bank,  1990,  p.65).
6  The thirty-year  contract  for  Abidjan  continued  and,  in addition.  SODECI  became  responsible  for the
installation  and maintenance  of pumps  in rural  areas  (hydraulique  villageoise).  The Ivoirian  government's
primary  motivation  for  reform  was its desire  to promote  growth  outside  of Abidjan  by improving  the
standard  of living  in smaller  cities  and  rural  areas  (World  Bank, 1974,  Annex 11,  p.1). In addition,  President
Houphouet-Boigny  had  been impressed  by both  the demand  for  potable  water  and the relative  efficiency  of
SODECI  compared  to the public  utility,  EECI  (Energie  Electrique  de C6te  d'Ivoire),  which  ran most other
water  systems  in  C6te  d'Ivoire
7 Since  many  agencies  changed  their  names,  sometimes  several  times,  during  the thirty-year  period,  for
ease  of exposition,  we will  refer  to all agencies  by their  names  in 1997.
511.2  Characteristics  of the Water Supply System  Prior to Reform
Source of  Water. Almost all of Abidjan's water comes from an abundant aquifer,
which should be able to supply sufficient water to satisfy demand in the medium term.'
Although Abidjan is close to the ocean, the water is not saline because the aquifer is in the
hilly northern part of the city.  The aquifer is located about 60 meters underground and is
protected by a thick layer of clay (World Bank, 1989, p.2) and, consequently, the water is
not highly polluted. 9
System expansion.  Partly due
7 __________-__________  to a large in-flow of immigrants
_  _6  . from neighboring  countries,  the
.°  5  population  of  Abidjan  grew
.- E  very  quickly  following
°  3-  independence, (see  Figure  1).
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X  1.  I  estimated to be about  180,000
0  ,  . . *.  1  in  1960, it was  estimated  to be
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close  to  3  million  in  1996.
* Population  of  Abidjan  * Total  Urban  Population  Although this rapid growth put
pressure  on  the  system,  the
Figure  1: Urban Population  in C6te d'Ivoire,  1960-1996  number  of  connections  grew
faster than  the  population  for
Source:  World Bank (1998).  most  of the  1960s and  1970s
(see Figure 7) and, consequently, coverage increased. Between 1960 and 1980, the number
of connections increased from 3,802 to 75,645-if  an average connection serves about 13.5
people, the coverage rate in Abidjan would have been close to 80% by  1980 (see Figure
9),10
In large part, this was due to a very amnbitious  investment program.  During the
1970s, annual investment averaged US$40 million (World Bank, 1993, p.10), much of it
financed through  government borrowing and  subsidies.  In  addition to  increasing the
number of connections, this also increased water produced (see Figure 2) and water billed
' World Bank (1982, p. 8) notes that it is estimated that the aquifer has a safe yield of around 700,000
m3/day.
'Although  the aquifer had become polluted in low-lying areas, SODECI had abandoned these wells by
the mid-1970s (World Bank, 1978, p.  13).
0 SODECI officials estimated that each connection served between 12 and 15 people in 1997.  Since the
ratio of connections to households has not changed significantly  since the 1980s, this might be a reasonable
estimate for this period also.
6(see Figure 6).  Between 1960 and 1980, production in Abidjan grew from 8.9 billion
m3/year to 65.0 billion m3/year and water billed grew from 5.0 billion m3/year to 50.7
billion m3/year.
Tarffs.  In 1974, the tariff
1  140  was  CFAF  55/r3
10 
E  100  ($0.25/m 3) in Abidjan and
Q0  ___  averaged  CFAF  80/r3
°0  ($0.36/m)  elsewhere.
o2C  20  _-,,,,,,,,,|,,,,,  ...... After  SODECI  became
0  ..  responsible  for  water
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supply in all urban areas,
- Total  _  Abidjan  ]  a nationally uniform tariff
of  CFAF  89.5/m 3
Figure  2: Water  Produced  (billions  of cubic  meters)  ($0.40/m 3)  was
Source:  SODECI.  imposed-subsidizing
water supply in secondary
cities was one of the main reasons for the 1974 reform."'  By 1979, it was estimated that
nearly 30% of the tariff in Abidjan went towards subsidizing water supply in secondary
cities.' 2 To compensate low-income users for the higher prices, a social tariff of CFAF
60/r3 ($0.27/r3) was introduced for the first Sm 3 of consumption  per month." 3 In addition,
the connection fee for small, low-income, consumers was lowered and then abolished.
Starting in 1976, consumers using pipes of 15mm and less did not have to pay a connection
fee, other than a deposit of CFAF 6000 ($25). In 1981, tariffs were increased, with the full
tariff  reaching  CFAF  224/r3 ($0.78/m 3)  and  the  social  tariff  reaching  CFAF  128
($0.45/m 3).  This made the average tariff CFAF 205 ($0.71/r3), of which CFAF 100/m 3
(0.35/m 3)  went  to  SODECI,  CFA  78/r3 ($0.27/r3)  to  the  FNH  and  CFAF  27/rn 3
($0.09/m 3) to the FNA (World  Bank, 1982).
Water and service quality.  Although it is difficult to find exact data, it appears that
service and water quality in Abidjan were good even before reform. World Bank (1982, p.
21)  reports  "SODECI  is  efficiently managed  and  provide  first  class  service  to  its
'1 World Bank  (1982) estimated  the average  incremental  cost (AIC) of a cubic meter  of water, which  it
used  to as a measure  of long-run  marginal  cost, for several  cities in CMte d'Ivoire.  The AIC  in Abidjan  was
estimated  at CFAF  104/m3. In comparison,  the average AIC  in eight secondary  centers was estimated  to be
CFAF 271/r 3. In the late 1980s, World  Bank (1990) estimated  that  the long-run  marginal  cost  of water was
CFAF  48 ($0.13)  in Abidjan  and CFAF  180 ($0.51)  in the rest of the country.
1 2CFAF 42/m3 out of the CFAF  149/rn 3 average tariff (World Bank,  1982, p. 22).
1Large  industrial  companies  paid  a lower tariff until  1984, when increases  in the 'industrial  tariff'  made
it higher  han the full domestic  tariff.
7consumers; water quality and pressure are uniformly good and unaccounted-for-water ... is
very satisfactory."
Unaccounted  for water.  Unaccounted for Water (UFW) in Abidjan has been low
by both regional and international standards (see Menard and Shirley, 2000). In  1980,
UFW was about 20% in Abidjan and was about 16% nationally.  Since metering has been
close to 100% since well before the 1988  reform, UFW is measured quite accurately.
Although  the  low  level  of
Unaccounted  for  Water  in Abidjan  UFW is quite impressive, it
is not a direct result of any
. 25%  - of  the  reforms.  Indeed,
20%  .__  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _fo  h r E  15%  t___  _  ?;  <  apart from a  short period
10%  -.  ~  '  '-between  1978  and  1980, 100/  _
5%  ___________________  UFW in  Abidjan has been
,o%_  . . . . . . consistently less  than  20%
1960  1966  1972  1978  1984  1990  1996  since the  early  1960s (see
Figure  3).  The  success
Figure  3: UFW  in Abidjan,  1960-1996  migh  re  flectThe might  partially  reflect  the
relatively young age of most
water systems in C6te d'Ivoire.  Between 1960 and 1995, the network grew from only 176
km to  10,149 km nationwide (SAUR, 1997).  In 1974, only 34 urban areas had water
systems, compared to  409 by  1995.  Another feature that might have  contributed to
SODECI's success with UFW is that SODECI has been responsible for maintenance of the
entire system.  In contrast, responsibility for maintenance has been divided between'two
agencies, SEEG and SONEG, in Guinea, generating conflict and ambiguities in decision-
making (see Menard and Clarke, 2000).  This emphasizes the importance of well-defined
responsibilities.
Billing and collection. By the early 1980s, SODECI's commercial operations (i.e.,
billing and collection) were strong by regional standards. Metering were almost universal,
billing, which was computerized, was executed efficiently (as demonstrated by the low
level of UFW) and collection rates from the private sector were high (World Bank, 1982, p.
9).14 In 1980, accounts receivable from the private sector accounted for about six months
of private sales (see Figure 12)."5 Given the delays associated with hand delivery and that
no direct debit system existed, meaning that bills had to be paid at local kiosks, this was
quite impressive.  One factor that might account for the high  collection rate was that
I 4 Indeed,  SODECI  partially  owned  a meter  assembly  company  (World  Bank,  1982,  p.21)
15 Private  sales  are estimated  as 75%  of total  sales. Private  sales  accounted  for  about 72%  of sales
(World  Bank, 1977)  in 1973,  78%  of sales  in 1987  and  74%  of sales  in 1992  (World  Bank, 1993).
8private  sector consumers were routinely cut off for non-payment.  Further, households
were  entitled to receive a free 'social'  connection only once. This gave them a strong
incentive to pay their bill regularly since if they were cut off, in addition to paying the
overdue bills, they would have to pay a large reconnection fee.
The collection rate from the public sector was considerably lower.  By 1980, public
sector accounts receivable were over one year of public sector sales (see Figure  12).16
Most overdue public bills, at this time, were from public institutions such as universities
and hospitals.  Part of the problem was that SODECI was not allowed to cut off public
sector customers who were delinquent (World Bank, 1995, p.6).  Because of this, public
sector customers had only a weak incentives  to pay their bills in a timely manner.
Labor  productivity.  Labor
0  14  productivity  has  improved
12
C  *F  *  _continuously  since the mid-1970s
0  10
o  and, by regional standards, labor
8
006  productivity at SODECI was quite
XL 4 - high by the mid-1980s. SODECI
2  - had approximately 10 workers per
o-  0  . 1000  connections  in  the  early
77  79  81  83  85  87  89  91  93  95  1980s,  compared to about 24, 32,
and  34  employees  per  1000
Figure 4: Workers Per  1,000  Connections (nationally)  cnn  in  Benn  Tog  and
connections in  Benin,  Togo  and
Source:  SODECI.  Guinea  respectively.  Although,
SODECI  initially  relied  heavily
on expatriates for managerial and
technical skills, it was slowly reducing its reliance upon them.  By the early 1980s, there
were less than 20 expatriate workers in  SODECI, compared to 43 in  1978 (SODECI,
various).  It accomplished this through an extensive training program designed to increase
the skills of local employees.  In 1974, SODECI opened a training facility that trained
many SODECI employees, including significant number of workers who later moved to
the government ministries responsible for regulation.
In part, the high productivity reflects the commercial orientation of SODECI, which
dominates the company despite the small government holding.  Both expatriate and local
managers receive high salaries and promotions are based upon performance. For workers,
SODECI provided stable jobs in an economic environment where most private jobs  are
16 See footnote 15.
9highly unstable. Evaluations by local managers determine about 20% of workers' salaries,
giving managers greater responsibility. In addition, SODECI has a "social fund" to finance
social activities and help employees with specific needs (e.g., for housing) and a training
program to help employees improve both their skills and their chances for promotions.
Unconnected households.  In  the  early  1980s, since there  were  few  public
standpipes-only  about 30 in  the entire city  (World Bank,  1982), most  unconnected
households got water from private water vendors or from wells." 7 At that time, and even
now,  resellers  played  an  active role  in  providing water to  unconnected households.
Compound owners often sold water to their tenants (the cost depending upon the volume
sold) and other individuals sold water to unconnected neighbors.  This provided extra
income to  the owner, while allowing poor households access to potable water without
having to pay access charges or face regular bills. 18 Water from the system was trucked to
unconnected areas by  professional water  vendors.  Although this  was  officially not
allowed, it was tolerated as a means of providing water to unauthorized residential areas.
In some low-lying, and less wealthy, areas (e.g., Treichville, Marcory, and Koumassi),
households have wells in their compounds.  Since the water from these wells is salty and
can be heavily contaminated, it is not generally used for drinking. However, in some areas
that are particularly poor (e.g., Treichville), households also drink the water despite the
negative impact on health.
Industrial enterprises were also allowed to use water from wells, but only after they
had been granted permission from the government to do so.  In addition, they had to pay
SODECI for the use of groundwater  resources and the disposal of wastewater. In practice,
many enterprises were exempt from these requirements, failed to register their boreholes,
or failed to pay the required fee.  In the late 1980s, it was estimated that less than 20% of
fees were collected from inventoried  boreholes (World Bank, 1990, p.  65).
Sewerage. Although recent studies have shown that the gains from improved water
supply are far greater when sewerage is also improved (Esrey, 1996), sewerage service has
always been separate from water supply in Abidjan.' 9 The sewerage system in Abidjan
17 According  to a 1987  study  (Diahou,  1994),  about  45.7%  of non-connected  households  got their  water
from  resellers  and  41.5%  from  standpipes  and  wells
1  In the early 1980s,  World  Bank (1982,  p. 37)  reports  that  10 liters  of water  cost  about CFAF  10. This
implies  a total  cost  of CFAF  1000/m 3. At this time,  the official  (non-social)  tariff  was  CFAF  224/r3. The
cost  seemed  similar  in 1997. In one compound,  in  the neighborhood  of Adjam6,  a connection  provided
water  to the (extended)  family  of 15  persons  and  the owner  also  sold water  to 10  tenants. The  prices  were  as
follow: 5 CFA  for a bag,  25 CFA  for a frozen  bag,  25 CFA  for a basin  and 150  CFA for a barrel  of 200
liters  (e.g., 750  CFA  per cubic  meter; by comparison,  the domestic  rate  at that  time  for an official
connection  was of 286  CFA  per cubic  meter)
19  Abidjan  was,  and  remains,  the only  city  with  piped sewerage  in Cote  d'Ivoire. A few  other  cities  have
rudimentary  sewerage/drainage  systems  (World  Bank, 1999).
10was less developed than the water system even before reform.  In 1975, there were about
34,900 sewerage connections, serving about 227,000 people-about  24% of the population
(World Bank,  1986a).  An additional 44% of the population used septic tanks and pit
latrines, while the rest of the population disposed of waste water and sewerage in unlined
pits and water courses (World Bank, 1986a). There were no sewerage treatment plants and,
therefore, untreated sewerage was dumped into the Ebrie Lagoon, around which the city
was built.  By the early  1970s, this  dumping had  overwhelmed the Lagoon's  natural
purification ability and large parts were highly polluted.  As part of a long-term plan to
improve the system, two World Bank supported projects attempted to increase coverage
and to divert the sewerage to areas of the lagoon where natural purification was strongest.
In  the  medium  term,  the  government intended to  by-pass the  lagoon  altogether by
constructing an ocean outflow pipe and pumping the sewerage out into the deep ocean.
Two World Bank projects increased sewerage coverage quite substantially in the 1970s and
1980s.  By  1985, there were 60,000 connections serving an estimated 635,000 people-
about 38% of Abidjan's population. In comparison, there were over 90,000 connections to
the water system.
Although SODECI often had limited maintenance contracts for parts of the system,
its role in the sector has been small and has always been separate from its role in water
supply.  Before  1974,  the  municipal  governments  were  formally  responsible  for
sewerage. 20 SODECI had  a limited maintenance contract for some parts of Abidjan's
sewerage system and collected a small surcharge on water (CFAF 4.5/m 3) to finance the
system (World Bank, 1974).  In 1974, the sewerage subsector was reorganized, with the
central government becoming more involved in  the sector.  A public  agency, SETU,
became responsible for planning and contracting new investment and a sister agency to the
FNH, the Fonds National de l'Assainissement (FNA) was given responsibility for sector
receipts and  payments (including debt service and financing investment).  Through a
management  contract,  SODECI  became  responsible  for  the  operation  and  (limited)
maintenance of the sewerage system and continued collecting a  surcharge on  water. 2"
Responsibility  for  the  planning,  design  and  construction  of  sewage  facilities  was
transferred from SETU to the Direction de l'Eau in April 1984 (World Bank, 1986a).
20 Originally,  the Municipality  ofAbidjan  was primarily  responsible  for the system. Once  urban
development  spilled  over  into the neighboring  Municipality  of Bingervilles,  the two  municipalities  shared
responsibility.  However,  since  they did  not have  the resources  to  manage  the sector,  the Ministry  of Public
Works;  the Societe  d 'Equipement  des Terrains  Urbains  (SET(), a government  owned  corporation,  and
various  housing  development  companies  constructed  most  sewers. Since  these  agencies  failed  to work
together,  the sewerage  system  was poorly  coordinated  and non-uniform.
21 There  was also  a surcharge  on property  taxes,  which  the FNA  used  to finance  debt service  and
investment  related  to drainage.
11III  Institutional Endowment at the Time of Reform
A central hypothesis  of our research is that the feasibility  and sustainability  of
reform  relies heavily  upon the credibility  and stability  of government  commitments. At
least  four aspects  of the institutional  environment  in CMte  d'Ivoire increased  the credibility
of the government's  commitment  to private sector  participation  in the water sector. First,
for nearly forty years following  independence,  the Ivoirian  government  was stable and,
consequently,  there was little threat of sudden changes in policy due to  the violent
overthrow  of the government.  Further,  although  a single  party dominated  Ivoirian  politics,
the party  maintained  its grip on power  through  a tradition  of extended  political  consensus.
This restricted  arbitrary  action  by the executive  by making  sharp changes  in policy  more
difficult. Second,  partly due to the tradition  of extended  consensus  and despite  the single
party state, Cote d'Ivoire developed a  bureaucracy  and judiciary that,  by  regional
standards, were quite professional.  This promoted the -credibility and stability of
government  policy. Third, the government  adopted  a pragmatic  position in its relations
with the West. This resulted  in a strong  relationship  with both the donor community  and
the French  Govermment,  increasing  the confidence  of foreign  (especially  French)  investors.
Finally, also contributing  to investor confidence,  the Government  had a long-standing
policy of encouraging  private sector  participation  in the economy,  in general,  and in the
water sector, in particular. Together,  these four factors  reduced the likelihood  that the
government  would  arbitrarily  expropriate  private  investment  and  boosted  confidence  in the
Ivoirian  economy.
11.1  Credibility: Historical  Background
Political  stability. In sharp  contrast  to other  West  African  countries,  Cote  d'Ivoire
was politically  and socially  stable for close to forty years following  independence.  The
political  institutions  that developed  define  what has been called an 'illiberal democracy.'
Although  a single party, the Parti Democratique  de la Cote d'Ivoire (PDCI) dominated
government,  it ruled  through  a process  of extended  consensus  and, thus, was not a classic
dictatorship. 22 Further, Ivoirian institutions  proved to  be capable of  making major
adjustments,  surviving  a severe  economic  downturn  in the 1980s  and 1990s.
The PDCI, led by its charismatic  leader Felix Houphouet-Boigny,  dominated
Ivoirian politics even before independence. Following  independence,  even though the
Constitution  continued  to allow other parties to exist, CMte  d'Ivoire quickly became a
22One plausible  reason  for the important  of consensus  in Ivoirian  politics  is that  no single  ethnic  group
was large  enough  to impose  its will on other  groups. Consequently,  President  Houphouet-Boigny,  who  was
from a very  minor group,  had to perfect  the politics  of inclusion  (Handloff,  1999,  p. xxxix).
12single party state.  However, single party rule in C6te d'Ivoire was quite different from
single party rule in most other West African countries. Rather than eliminating opponents
through arrest and exile, the PDCI eliminated opposition by progressively absorbing other
political  groups.  Leaders  of  opposition  groups were  given  influential  and  lucrative
positions in the government or the PDCI to ensure their cooperation (e.g., the "Political
Board" elected by the Congress of the Party included leaders of most political tendencies).
As  a consequence of  this policy, the PDCI became more ideologically and ethnically
diverse over time and gained the support of most ethnic groups. 23
Further, although the unicameral assembly was (and remained through the 1990s)
dominated by the PDCI, it promoted stability by allowing local and tribal interests to be
involved in the decision-making process.  This diffused tension and made redistribution
between regions easier (e.g., the cross-subsidization  between Abidjan and secondary cities
in the water sector).  In addition to promoting stability, the institutions that supported the
PDCI's policy of building consensus also proved to be an informal constraint on arbitrary
action by the executive and, consequently, increased the confidence  of private investors.
To  summarize, notwithstanding democratization in the  1990s, a single party has
dominated C6te d'Ivoire  for nearly forty years.  In general, the party has worked as a
coalition and has absorbed many opponents.  Due to this, and to the charismatic figure of
President Houphoiuet-Boigny,  the regime has remained remarkably stable, even during
major economic crises.  Moreover, the regime has shown a remarkable capacity to adapt
(e.g.,  after  the  death  of  President  Houphouet-Boigny).  This  stability  makes  the
government's  commitment to  contractual  arrangements more  credible and,  therefore,
ultimately makes reform sustainable. 24
A  pragmatic  policy  toward  the  west.  Following independence, the  Ivoirian
government adopted a pragmatic policy towards France, the colonial power that had ruled
C6te d'Ivoire  before independence, and  other Western countries. Consequently, C6te
d'Ivoire received considerable support from both France and international organizations in
the years following independence. 25 The policies encouraged French firms involved in
West Africa to invest in C6te d'Ivoire and French expatriates from other former colonies to
move to C6te d'Ivoire, contributing  to the economic  boom that followed independence.
23 For  example,  Houphoilet-Boigny  went  through  "initiations"  according  to  the  rites  of the  major  groups,
thus consolidating  his legitimacy  by rooting  it in local  traditions.
24 The military  coup  that  shook  the government  and  the Ivoirian  society  in late 1999,  when  this  paper
was being  finished,  does  not seem  to have  affected  so far the basic  trends  described  in what  follows.
2  The support  of international  organizations  becarne  particularly  obvious  in  the late seventies  and early
eighties,  when a large  amount  of international  resources  were  provided  to help the regime  confront  the
deteriorating  economic  conditions.
13There are several plausible reasons for the limited reaction against the colonial
regime  following independence.  First,  the  French  administration's  policies  in  CMte
d'Ivoire might have been less restrictive than in other West African colonies, provoking a
more moderate reaction following independence. 26 In part, the less restrictive French rule
reflected the French view that CMte  d'Ivoire was a relatively minor territory with limited
resources, poor  access to  the  sea  for most  of  the country,  and  weak  prospects  for
development.  Second, the pragmatic policy was a response to political developments in
Cote d'Ivoire before independence. Young (1982, p.  193-194) argues that, in contrast to
neighboring countries, the main supporters of the PDCI, which was the most important pre-
independence movement in C6te d'Ivoire, had an interest in promoting capitalism and
good relations with the former colonial power.  The PDCI grew out of an association of
relatively wealthy African coffee and  cocoa planters, the  Syndicat Agricole  Africain.
Consequently, following independence, the PDCI adopted policies that would benefit the
planters, who  were  capitalist  in  outlook and  dependent  upon  exports.  Although  the
character of the PDCI changed as it absorbed other political groups, the economic success
of  CMte d'Ivoire  following  independence  legitimized  its  policies  towards  foreign
investment and the private sector.
Stable institutions.  The credibility of Ivoirian government is also backed by a set
of stable institutions, based upon those in France.  By regional standards, CMte  d'Ivoire
developed  a  relatively efficient and well-trained bureaucracy.  The French  policy  of
assimilation, which encouraged the repression of local cultural traditions, resulted in the
colonial  administration training  a  local  elite.  Consequently, by  Independence, Cote
d'Ivoire had a relatively large pool of well-trained individuals, with technical as well as
managerial expertise.  Further, in areas where local expertise was lacking, C6te d'Ivoire's
pragmatic policy towards France allowed it to rely upon expatriates after independence
(Young,  1982). Finally, perhaps  due  to  the political  diversity within  the  PDCI,  the
bureaucracy does not function only according to political criteria as is usual in a single
party regime.
Most  of  the  public  agencies  involved in  the water  sector are  thought  to  be
competent by observers in the private operator, in international organizations and within
the Ivoirian government.  The Bureau National d'Etudes Technique et de Developpement
(BNEDT), which currently advises the main regulator, the Direction de l 'Eau, on technical
issues related to  investment, has  considerable expertise  in  this  area.  Similarly, the
26  does  not mean  that  there  were  no restrictions.  Many'standard  colonial  policies  were
implemented.  Administration  and export  activities  were  dominated  by the French  and  many laws  restricted
local freedom  (e.g.,  political  parties  that  were  specific  to Cote  d'Ivoire  were  not allowed).
14institution responsible for managing sector debt, the Caisse Autonome d'Amortissement
(CAA), is also seen as competent.
In addition to  a relatively professional bureaucracy, the judiciary is active and,
although the  Supreme Court (now called the Constitutional Council) is only  a limited
check on executive action, the judicial system is relatively developed.  Judges are trained
for  two  years  after  graduation from  University  and  there  is  a  tradition  of  judicial
intervention to settle commercial disputes. 27 Contracts can be enforced, although the cost
of appealing to the Courts is high in financial and, more importantly, symbolic terms.
A  tradition of private  sector participation  in the  economy.  In  addition to  a
pragmatic  approach to  the  West, the  Ivoirian government also  adopted policies  that
encouraged private sector participation in the economy. As discussed above, these policies,
which were supported by the relatively wealthy African planters who were the original
supporters  of  the  PDCI,  were  legitimized by  the  economic  success  that  followed
independence. This outlook towards the private sector, in part, explains the government's
decision to allow SODECI to continue operating in Abidjan after independence. However,
as noted by Young (1982, p. 192), the government's capitalist outlook was tempered by a
tradition of public intervention, particularly in the development of infrastructure.  This
tradition is consistent with the  1967 decision to make the public sector responsible for
investment in the water sector.  The long involvement of SODECI in the water sector
makes this commitment especially credible in this sector.
IV  Motivation  for Reform
In contrast to the other case studies, in which reform resulted from a combination of
a  macroeconomic  crisis,  a  realignment  of  political  forces  and  a  sector  crisis,  a
macroeconomic crisis alone was the main motivation for reform of the water sector in Cote
d'Ivoire.  The macroeconomic crisis reduced the public resources available for investment,
slowing expansion of  the water  system,  and  resulted in  reductions  in  formal  sector
employment and wages, making high tariffs more painful for consumers.  However, the
overall performance of the system remained strong, especially by regional standards.  In
the absence of either a sector-specific  crisis or a major change in the government's support
base, the macroeconomic crisis encouraged only a minor reform aimed at lowering tariffs
and financing investment through sector revenues. Since the crisis had had a greater effect
on the finances of the government agencies involved in the sector than on SODECI's
finances and since the government had been responsible for investment, sector problems
27 In rural areas, this is complemented  by the active role of the "tribunaux coutumiers", based on the
traditional privilege of the elders.
15could not be blamed on the private operator.  Consequently, there was little pressure to
reduce  the  private  operator's  role  in  the  sector  and,  in  fact,  the  private  operator's
responsibilities were increased following reform.
IV.1  A Major  Macroeconomic  Crisis
After twenty years of sustained growth-GDP  growth averaged over 8% per year
between 1961 and  1979-C8te  d'Ivoire was hit by a series of macroeconomic shocks.
Serious drops in cocoa and coffee prices (which represented over 60% of C8te d'Ivoire's
merchandise exports in 1979), led to a 30% decrease in the price of exports between 1977
and 1980 (Demery, 1994).  This radically slowed growth, and, combined with an overly
ambitious development program in the late 1970s,  resulted in a large increase in the public
sector deficit. 28 This, in turn, caused a dramatic increase in public sector debt, which grew
from 25% to 83% of GDP between 1975 and 1985 (see Figure 5).
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Figure 5: Public Debt as Percent of GDP  with  real  per  capita  GDP
Source: World Bank (1998).  dropping 33% between 1980 and
1985.  In spite of a second SAP
between 1984 and  1986, and a
brief spurt of growth following a temporary improvement in the cacao and coffee markets,
coffee and cacao prices reversed again in the late 1980s and the economic deterioration
2S  The public sector deficit was 12% of GDP in 1981 and 8% of GDP in 1987. In addition, the CFA
Franc became overvalued (the CFA Franc gained close to 50% against the US$ between 1980 and 1986).
29 See Demery (1994) for a description of CMte  d'Ivoire's  structural adjustment programs, and
Berthelemy and Bourguignon (1996) for an analysis of macroeconomic  trends in the period under review.
16continued. 30 Although the government responded with new measures to attract investment
and liberalize the economy, the measures failed to reverse the economic decline. Further
attempts at stabilization in the early 1990s failed and the economy did not start to recover
until the devaluation of the CFA Franc in 1994. It is in this context that reform of the water
sector was proposed and implemented in the late 1980s.  3
IV.2  Political Unrest and Democratization
The long period of economic crisis was accompanied by a significant evolution in
political institutions.  Since the success of the Ivoirian economy in the 1960s and 1970s
contributed to the legitimacy of PDCI rule, the economy's collapse in the early 1980s led
to  an increase in  unrest and political instability.  After the first structural  adjustment
program (SAP) was adopted in 1983, opposition to the government developed.  Initially
the opposition's  main  supporters were  students  and teachers, but  gradually it  gained
support in urban areas, including from public workers whose wages were falling in real
terms.  Although  the  movement  was  not  strong  enough  to  encourage  immediate
democratization (i.e., the PDCI remained the only legal party), it did encourage some basic
reforms. 32
The continuing economic problems led to further political unrest throughout the
1980s.  In 1990, unrest and violence increased and riots and strikes by public sector workers
and students forced the government to abandon major parts of its IMF and World Bank
backed  Structural Adjustment Program-most  notably, proposed cuts  in  public  sector
wages.  It also led the government to accept the introduction of formal democracy.  On
May  30,  1990, nine political  parties were  legally recognized.  Despite the  economic
30The long-term downward price trend appears to have been due to an increase in worldwide
production. Cocoa and coffee production increased 66% and 20% respectively between 1978 and 1988. The
new decline led to per capita GDP falling at an annual rate of -2.2% between 1986 and 1990.  Although the
brief recovery in the mid-1980s led to a reduction in the public sector deficit, which fell to 3.8% of GDP in
1986,  the continued decline meant the improvement was short-lived and the deficit reached 16.6% of GDP
by 1989.
31 Data in this section on fiscal deficits, growth, exchange rates, exports and investrnent are from World
Bank (1998).  Data on international Coffee and Cocoa production are from Food and Agriculture
Organization (1998b). Per capita GDP is PPP adjusted GDP (in US dollars from World Bank (1998).
32 In 1980, President Houphouet-Boigny had pernitted open elections  (within the PDCI) to the National
Assembly, resulting in the replacement of two-thirds of the legislature. This was expanded to local party and
municipal offices in 1985. In 1987,  the state-controlled  broadcaster began to allow (controlled) political
debate on one of its shows (Handloff, 1991,  p. 167-68).
17conditions, elections in October of that year confirmed the continuing popularity and
influence of President  Houphouet-Boigny  and the PDCI. 33
Although  the  reform of  the  water  system  occurred during  the  transition  to
democracy, it does not seem that this had a significant effect on the nature of reform.  In
the late 1980s when the reform was proposed and implemented, opposition parties were
still illegal and the PDCI remained dominant, and reasonably popular, throughout Ivoirian
society (even in urban areas).  Although the economic crisis had provoked unrest, no
credible alternative to the PDCI had emerged (and still had not even by the mid-1990s)
and, therefore, there was no large shift in political forces. Consequently, although the
falling wages and social unrest probably motivated the government to look for ways to
reduce tariffs, since sector performance was  reasonable there was  little  pressure for
wholesale sector reform.
IV.3  The Effect of the Macroeconomic  Crisis on Sector Performance
In most respects, the water system in Abidjan continued to perform well in the
early-mid 1980s (see previous section)-quality  remained high, UFW remained low, the
commercial performance of the operator remained strong and productivity continued to
improve.  However, the  macroeconomic crisis  negatively  impacted sector  finances,
especially for the public entities responsible for debt service and investment. Although this
did not threaten the  system with immediate collapse, it did  raise questions about the
sustainability of the current system, especially related to  future expansion, and led to a
modest reform designed  to tackle the most pressing issues.
The most direct impact that the macroeconomic  crisis had on sector performance
was that it slowed demand growth. The amount of water billed in Abidjan, which had been
growing at an average rate of 8% in the 1970s, stagnated in the early 1980s (see Figure 6).
Since, even at this time, most consumption was metered this had an immediate impact on
sector revenues. The main reason for the stagnation was a collapse in demand from large
industrial and commercial consumers, which fell 30% between  1980 and  1985 (World
Bank, 1990, p.21).  Although the number of connections continued to grow, most new
connections were 'social  connections' for poor households who consumed little water.
Consequently, the consumption from new  connections only just  offset the decline in
industrial consumption and the amount of water that was billed stagnated.
3  According to official results, President Houphouet-Boigny  received 81.7% of the vote in the
presidential election and the PDCI won 163 of the 175 seats in the National Assembly. The opposition
claimed that the result was fraudulent.
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Source: SODECI.
increase  had  a  significant
impact on the behavior of large users, already squeezed  by the macroeconomic  crisis, who
started to reduce waste, recycle water, and rely upon their own wells. 34 Consequently,
despite a recovery in the Ivoirian economy, total demand fell in 1984 and 1985 (see Figure
6).
Although the slower growth affected  the entire sector, SODECI was shielded from
the effect on sector revenues in two ways. First, SODECI's compensation was based upon
projected, not  actual, revenues.  Consequently, since the slower demand growth was
largely unanticipated in the early years of the crisis, SODECI was partially protected from
the slowdown.  Second, SODECI's remuneration per cubic meter was about the same for
all tariff levels (between about CFAF 150 and  180/m 3 in  1984).  Consequently, since
demand from small users increased in the early-mid 1980s, SODECI's additional revenues
from small consumers made up for the decrease in revenue due to the drop in industrial
consumption.
34Although,  technically,  industrial  users  had  to get permission  to drill  wells  and  had  to pay an extraction
fee to SODECI, legal loopholes and poor compliance meant that very few actually did.
19Table 1: Tariff Rates in C8te d'Ivoire
(in CFA Fr)
Oct.  Jan
1984-  1987 - 1994* - May  Percentage
Sept.  Jan.  May  1996-  change in  real
1983  1987  1994  1996  1999****  terrms,  1987-1997
"Social" Tariff
(upto  18m3)**  187  187  159  159  184  -36.1%
"Domestic" Tariff
(19 to 90m3)  261  261  209  230  286  -25.7%
"Normal" Tariff
(91 to 300m3)  300  330  307  368  464  -16.5%
"Industrial" Tariff
(more than
300m 3)***  252  458  350  424  532  -28.7%
Administrative  261  261  261  311  390  -17.5%
Tariff
*  Tariff  was approved  in April 1994,  but was applied  retrospectively  from January  12, 1994  (the date of the
devaluation  of the CFA  Franc).
**  Minimum  consumption  is 9m 3. If consumption  is less  than 9m 3, it is billed  as 9m 3. Before 1987,  there
was  a fee for 'social' connections  that  resulted  in the average  price  shown  here.
***  Tariff  was reduced  from CFAF  412  to CFAF  350  in 1990,  as a condition  for second  tranche  release  of a
World  Bank  loan.
*  Tariffs  were  in force  through  at least until early 1999  (World  Bank, 1999).
In contrast,  remuneration  per  cubic meter  for the government  funds  (i.e.,  the FNH
and FNA)  was far lower  for smaller  consumers  than  for industrial  consumers  (CFAF 0/m3
for  small  users  compared  to 300/m3 for industrial  consumers).  In fact, about  70% of the
revenues  from the 'rental  fee' paid  to the government  funds came from a few hundred  large
industrial  users by the time of reform  (World  Bank,  1990, p. 21).  The increase  in demand
from small users, therefore, failed to compensate the government for the large drop in
industrial consumption. This significantly  reduced the FNH's ability to service sector debt
and, by 1986, it was estimated that FNH resources could cover only 60% of sector debt
service (World Bank, 1990, p. 19).
20Through  its  impact  on
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Figure 7: Growth  of Connections  and Population  in Abidjan  spending,  including
Source: SODECI  (various);  World  Bank (1998).  spending  on  public
investment.  Since
population  growth
remained fast (see Figure 1) and over 90% of investment was financed through government
subsidies and public borrowing, this was a serious threat to the continued development of
the water sector. 35 Due to this, the growth in the number of connections started to lag
population growth (see Figure 7) and, consequently, coverage fell (see Figure 9).  The
problems in public finances also increased overdue bills from the public sector, further
impacting sector finances.  Between 1980 and 1985, the ratio of accounts receivable to
total sales increased from about 15 months to over three years for the public sector (see
Figure 12).  Since the public sector accounted for about 25% of total revenue, this was a
significant problem.
Although sector finances suffered due to the macroeconomic crisis, the crisis did
not result in a major sector crisis and, consequently, failed to motivate a major sector
reform.  One reason for this was that the financial difficulties (i.e., the reduced resources
for debt service and future investment) had only a minor impact on current consumers.
Indeed,  since  quality  remained  high  and  tariffs  for  non-industrial  consumers  were
unaffected, sector problems were largely invisible to most non-industrial consumers.  This
meant that pressure for reform was not widespread.
"  Between  1975 and 1987, 80% of investment  was funded  from borrowing  from bilateral  and
multilateral  agencies  (52% of lending,  including  soft-term  lending)  and from commercial  banks  (48%  of
lending  including  lending by the Banque  Centrale  des Etats  d'Afrique  de l'Ouest).  In addition,  13% of
investment  was funded  from government  subsidies.  The remaining  7% was funded  from internal  cash
generation  (World  Bank,  1990, p.  24).  This need also increased  the importance  of foreign  aid and, therefore,
the ability of donors  to demand  reform.  In exchange  for support,  mostly  from France,  the IMF and the
World Bank,  international  lenders pushed  for increased  autonomy  for the private  operator.
21Although the private operator had been responsible for operations and maintenance,
the problems did not lead to calls for reducing private sector participation in the sector. In
large part, this was because the problems did not appear to be due to SODECI.  In fact, the
public entities had greater financial problems and were responsible for both areas where
problems were  evident-debt  service and  investment.  Further, mistakes made by the
Direction de l 'Eau reduced confidence  in the public entities involved in the sector. Despite
the economic problems, the Direction de V'Eau  continued to forecast fast growth in water
demand in the 1980s.  It, therefore, continued to invest in productive capacity in Abidjan
and  the secondary centers  and, by  the mid-1980s, the  utilization rate  for  productive
capacity was very low. 36 Since the crunch in investment had slowed connection growth
and caused a drop in the coverage rates (see Figure 9), the Direction de l 'Eau was accused
of misdirecting investment towards large-scale production facilities. This, in part, explains
why the Direction de l 'Eau 's responsibilities were reduced following reform.
V  Contractual Arrangement and Institutional Complexities
Although the macroeconomic crisis had a negative effect on some aspects of sector
perfornance,  in the absence of a sector crisis or a major realignment of political forces, it
failed to provoke a complete reorganization of the sector.  Consequently, although the
contractual arrangement was modified in some significant ways, the 1988 reform was not a
radical departure from the pre-existing situation and it did not disrupt the relationship
between the various partners to the contract.  The success of the previous arrangement
made the initial reform feasible,  while the credible commitments built by the Ivoirian
government, which allowed the contractual arrangement to continue to evolve over time,
ensured sustainability.  In this section, we examine the design and implementation of the
contractual arrangement that came into effect in July 1988 and discuss the subsequent
adjustments. To explain the success of the arrangement and its limitations, we focus the
analysis on the interaction between micro-institutions and the main characteristics of the
contract, especially its informational scheme and incentive factors.
V.1  Changes in Micro-Institutions
The new twenty-year contract, which became effective in July 1988, affected sector
organization in  several ways.  First,  SODECI's  responsibilities related to  investment
planning and implementation were increased, its compensation was reduced, and it was
36 In 1987,  it was estimated  to be about 50%  in Abidjan  and  28% in  the secondary  centers  (World  Bank,
1990,  p. 20). Recent  estimates  suggest  the true  utilization  rate  was,  however,  probably  higher  than  this. At
the end of 1993,  SODECI  estimated  that  the utilization  rate  was about  90%  (World  Bank, 1994,  p.6),  even
though  actual  production  had  increased  by less  than 20%  over  this  period.
22exposed to greater risk.  Second, the reform brought BNEDT (Bureau National d'Etudes
Techniques et de Developpement), an additional public agency into the sector. 37 This had a
significant effect on responsibilities of the Direction de l 'Eau, which had been responsible
for both investment and monitoring the contract with SODECI before reform.  Third, the
macroeconomic crisis  and  the large  government debt  convinced the  government and
international donors that investment should be self-financed. Part of the water tariff was to
be paid to a new fund, the Fonds de Developpement  de l 'Eau (FDE), which would be used
to finance investment.  Finally, a new entity, the Fonds National de l'Eau (FNE), which
was formed by merging the insolvent Fonds National de l'Hydraulique  (FNH) with its
solvent sister agency the Fonds National de l'Assainissement (FNA), became responsible
for debt service.
Initial negotiations between the World Bank, the Direction de l'Eau and SODECI
had focused on implementing a full concession contract. Under this agreement, SODECI
would have assumed all responsibilities related to  investment and would have become
responsible for sector debt. However, after BNEDT became involved in the negotiations, it
questioned whether sectoral revenues would cover debt service requirements in the years
immediately following reform.  SODECI then asserted that the imbalance between its
equity and sectoral liabilities would create considerable risk (World Bank,  1993). The
unfavorable economic environment and the related social tensions and political risks were
also part of the background to the negotiation. The idea of a full concession was therefore
abandoned in favor of a  contract that is close to  a lease, but  which gives the private
operator significant control over investment.
V.1.A  Public Agencies: Who Does What?
The  reform resulted in  a  major realignment of  responsibilities for the  various
government agencies involved in the sector.  One significant change was that a public
agency, BNETD, which had not been active in the sector before reform, assumed a pivotal
role.  BNEDT became involved in the sector when, in January 1987, the President made it
responsible for the preparation of a series of Sectoral Adjustment Loans (SECALs) from
the World Bank.  Since these loans included a Water Supply and Sanitation SECAL,
designed to support sector reform, BNEDT assumed responsibility for negotiating the new
contract with SODECI. Figure 8 shows sector organization as of the end of 1997.
37 At the time of reform, BNEDT was called DCGTx (the "Direction  Centrale des Grands Travaux").
We refer to it as BNEDT throughout the text for ease of exposition.
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Figure  8:  Sector  Organization
After the negotiations with the World Bank and SODECI were complete, BNEDT
continued to be  active in  the sector.  As discussed in  detail below,  the  1988 reform
transferred responsibility for investment planning and implementation from the Direction
de l'Eau to SODECI. At the same  time, BNEDT  assumed  responsibility  for supervising
SODECI's  investment  activities. Several  factors  influenced  the transfer  of responsibility
from the Direction  de l'Eau to BNEDT. First, BNEDT's  successful  contract  negotiations
with SODECI  convinced  many observers  that BNEDT  was competent  to assume  the role.
24Second, the powerful director of BNETD, Antoine Cesareo,  who was close to the President
Houphouet-Boigny used his influence to expand BNEDT's role. Finally, the Direction de
l'Eau's  perceived problems managing investment (i.e., the over-investment in production
facilities and under-investment in the distribution network) before reform made observers
question its competence.
Conflicting micro-institutions. Although it no longer had direct responsibility for
investment, the Direction de V'Eau  remained responsible for monitoring the contract with
SODECI  and  negotiating the  price  of  water.  This  created  some  ambiguity  in  its
relationship with BNEDT and, subsequently, led to  tension between the two agencies,
which was aggravated by ill will due to the transfer and by the different skills and priorities
of the two agencies.
The Direction de l'Eau  was, and remains, far smaller than BNEDT (staffs of 250
and 1000 respectively in 1998). It is part of the METT, a very large ministry, and has most
of its  expertise in rural water supply.  Consequently, a significant part of its  staff  is
dispersed throughout the country.  This provides them with a detailed knowledge of the
situation outside of Abidjan, but leaves them with neither the time nor the expertise to
closely monitor the contract with SODECI.  Consequently, it tended to adopt a hands-off
approach towards SODECI.
BNEDT is located in the Prime Minister's office and its directors have been close
to  the highest levels  of  Government.  This  has  allowed it to  overrule line  ministry
decisions. It proposed, planned and implemented most major public works and, because of
its  special status  (including higher salaries) attracted an  excellent group of  engineers,
mostly trained abroad. BNEDT took a very active role in planning and developing sector
facilities and, consequently, closely monitored and continuously interfered with SODECI's
plans.
Tensions between these agencies, and between the agencies and the private operator
developed over time.  The conflict forced SODECI, which implemented most investment,
to  get approval from both  the Direction de  l'Eau  and BNEDT, making the approval
process long,  inefficient and costly.  This  further increased tension between the three
partners, making investment  decisions even more difficult and leading international lenders
to push for change.  In May 1995, a formal agreement was signed that made the Direction
de V'Eau  responsible for supervising new investment and reducing BNETD to a technical
consultant to the Direction de l'Eau.  After a difficult adjustment period, all participants
seem happy with the new system. 38 This supports the hypothesis that water reform success
38AAlthough the 1995  adjustment  clarified  the relationship  between  the Direction  de I 'Eau  and  BNETD,
another  agency,  the Haut Commissariat  t I'Hydraulique  (HCH),  was  introduced  at about  the same  time. At
25depends  on  clear  rules  for  making  decisions and  for  solving  disputes.  The  1995
institutional  adjustment  simplified the  decision-making structure,  putting  one  well-
identified agency in charge of the sector.  The main weakness of the new arrangement is
that the Direction de V'Eau  has only limited technical capacity, reducing the control it has
over SODECI. 39
Investment and risk.  Two other public agencies, the Fonds de Developpement de
l'Eau and the Fonds National de l'Eau are responsible for financing investment and debt
service.  The Fonds  de  Developpement de  1'Eau (FDE) was created to  finance new
investment and 'social connections' for low-income consumers.  Its resources primarily
come from the water tariff, through the 'rental fee'.  Although it can borrow from lenders,
one of the main goals of reform was to make the system largely self-sufficient. 40 In 1997,
about 24% of the tariff (CFA FR 76.55) was paid into the Fond de De'veloppement de
1'Eau. 41 The budget of the FDE, according to Direction de /'Eau,  was CFAF 7 billion
($11.7 million) in  1997, including CFAF 4 billion ($6.7 million) for Abidjan.  'Social
connections' accounted for 50% of investment, maintenance for 20% and system extension
for 30% (Field Interviews, 1998).
An additional 14% of the tariff (CFA Fr 44) went to the Fond National de l 'Eau,
which services sector debt and pays for the operation and maintenance of the sewerage
this  time,  it was  not clear  whether  the HCH  would  simply  be a coordinating  body,  where  agencies  could
meet and reach agreement  on sector policy, or whether it would be a full agency with regulatory power.
Most importantly, the different agencies involved in the sector were unsure whether, and how, the HCH's
sector policy might constrain other agency's activities. For example, if the HCH became a regulatory entity,
it would presumably manage how the Direction de l 'Eau monitored the contract with SODECI. There was
even the possibility, that it might interfere directly with SODECI's decisions regarding investment or
maintenance of the water system. However, recent developments  suggest that the HCH's role will be
relatively minor, coordinating  projects and helping to implement  the plans of the regional agencies that
monitor the major water basins. Although field interviews suggest that initial tensions have been relaxed
recently, it shows how easily uncertainty due to changes in institutional  structure within the government  can
develop.
3  Other public agencies monitor infrastructure  and water quality. In principle, the Institut National
d 'Hygiene Publique (INHP) monitors sanitary standards  but, in practice, it is both under-staffed and under-
equipped. The result is that SODECI is the main control on water quality. The Laboratoire National
d'Essais et de Metrologie Appliqu&e  (LANEMA) tests equipment quality, while the Direction de I 'Eau with
technical support from BNEDT, checks that infrastructure conforms to intemational standards. SODECI
directly controls the quality of technical equipment it provides and implemented ISO 9000 standards by the
end of 1998.
40 Between 1987 and 1997, the FDE did not borrow any funds. The 1990  Sectoral Adjustment Loan
from the World  Bank was balance of payments support and, therefore was not linked to specific investments.
In 1996,  loans from the Caisse Francaise de Developpement and a smaller amount from the German KAW
were mostly to cover the Government's debt to SODECI.
41 In comparison, SODECI received 56% of the tariff (CFAF 182.6)  for operations and maintenance of
the system.
26system. 42 This fund is managed by the Caisse Autonome d'Amortissement (CAA), an
agency in the Ministry of Economy and Finance that manages public debt.  Because new
investment was being funded through the tariff rather than through new borrowing, it was
hoped  after a  few years, the FNE would be able to transfer resources to  the FDE  for
investment. In practice this never occurred, due to continued non-payment of bills by the
public sector.
V.l.B  Private Operator
Under  the  1988  contract,  SODECI  remained  responsible  for  operation  and
maintenance of all urban water systems, including responsibility for metering, billing and
collection from all private  and public-sector customers.  However, there were  several
significant changes that  affected SODECI's  responsibilities, its  remuneration  and  its
incentives.
Responsibility  for investment. Although the contract specifies that the Republic of
C8te d'Ivoire retains ownership of sector assets, most responsibility for investment was
tasferred  to SODECI.  As noted earlier, this was due, in part, to suggestions that the
Direction de l'Eau  had inappropriately over-invested in large production facilities at the
expense of the distribution network during the early years of the crisis.  Formally, the
Government remained in charge of supervising investment and managing the Fonds de
Developpement  de  l'Eau  (FDE),  while  responsibility  for  planning  and  executing
investment was transferred to SODECI. Because of this, many observers call the contract a
concession. However, since SODECI can not borrow to finance investment and, therefore,
does not bear any investment-related risk the contract is a lease using the terminology of
this project. 43 Despite the provisions that made SODECI formally responsible for planning
and executing investment, BNEDT actually performed these roles for the first seven years
of the lease.  As discussed in the next sub-section, when responsibility for supervising
investment was transferred from BNEDT to the Direction de l'Eau,  SODECI's control
over investment planning and execution increased substantially.'  By mutual agreement
with the Direction de l 'Eau, SODECI can implement investments of less than 120 million
CFA francs (about $220,000 in 1996) with no tender. 45 The provision was intended to
cover daily maintenance of the system and the installation of 'social connections'.
42 The final 6% (CFA Fr 20.35) was paid to the government as a value-added tax.
4  See M6nard and Shirley (2000) for a description of each type of contract.
During field interviews, all participants agreed that BNEDT played a far more active and aggressive
role concerning investment  planning and execution, than the Direction de I 'Eau has.
45 Before the devaluation of the CFA Franc in 1994,  the limit was set at CFAF 80 million (about
$270,000).
27Proponents of this agreement argue this is appropriate since maintenance and the
small investments covered by this provision usually need to be implemented quickly and
often require substantial coordination with operations to  be implemented at least cost.
Although public advertising and bidding might lower the amount up-front cost of these
investments, they argue the cost of delays and disruption to operations would outweigh the
small financial benefit.  Opponents note, however, that SODECI has used this provision to
split major investments into small lots that could be  realized without a  tender.  They
emphasize that no investments were bid between 1993 and 1997 and that very few were
bid at any time in the first ten years of the contract.  SODECI responds that, due to the
economic crisis and subsequent government non-payment, there were no large investments
over this period and, therefore most investment was, in fact, for maintenance and social
connections.  As  noted  in  World  Bank  (1999,  p.30),  although  the  evidence  is  not
conclusive, some studies have suggested that SODECI might be making excessive profits
on its infrastructure-related activities.
Although  the  transfer  of  responsibility  for  investment  coincided  with  an
improvement in  the  coverage  rate  in  Abidjan,  despite  a  large  drop  in  investment
expenditures, this  arrangement has been criticized for several reasons.  First,  although
SODECI controls investment, as it would in a concession contract, it does not bear the
financial risk associated with investment. While this might not be a large concern when
investment is funded through the tariff, if the government starts to  finance significant
amounts of investment through government borrowing, SODECI might have an incentive
to encourage over-investment or to invest inefficiently.  Since sector resources do not
appear to be sufficient for funding future investment needs without additional borrowing,
this is a distinct possibility.  Second, the ambiguous allocation of responsibilities might
distort incentives. On the  one hand,  SODECI's revenues depend upon its  capacity to
connect and collect, which gives it an incentive to invest efficiently to expand the system.
On the other hand, SODECI's incentive to invest may be low since it might prefer to hold
funds hostage to government receivables or to try to divert investment funds to its owners.
Finally, provisions allowing SODECI to avoid bidding for small investments have reduced
competition in the sector, increased information asymmetries, and might have distorted
investment decisions (i.e., encouraged excessive investment  in social connections and other
small-scale investments).
All of these problems have been aggravated by the poor quality of the information
available on investment and sector assets-a  problem noted in World Bank studies since
the  period  before the  1988 reform  (see,  for  example, World Bank,  1999). Lack  of
information on investment and assets makes it difficult to  assess sector needs  and to
evaluate current investment policy.  Although public agencies often find it difficult to
obtain and collect relevant information, especially in cost-plus regulatory schemes, poor
28information appears to be an especially significant problem in CMte  d'Ivoire. One possible
reason for the problem is the large number of public agencies involved in the sector and the
overlapping and changing responsibilities.  By making it easier for SODECI to conceal
information and by making it more difficult for the regulatory agencies to develop the
skills required to monitor the contract, this has increased information asymmetries.  In
addition,  the  resulting  inter-agency disputes  might have  worsened  information flows
between the relevant public agencies, further aggravating  the problem.
Remuneration.  In  addition to  a  change  in  responsibilities, the  new  contract
reduced SODECI's remuneration.  Suggesting that it might allow other companies to bid
for the contract, BNEDT managed to negotiate a 20% reduction in the part of the tariff paid
to  SODECI.  The  reduction  allowed BNEDT  to  allocate  CFAF  28/rn 3 for  financing
investment, while reducing water tariffs.
Rural water.  In return for the cut in  SODECI's remuneration, in  addition to
increasing SODECI's control of investment and agreeing not to put the contract out for
tender, BNEDT also released SODECI from its responsibility for rural water points.  Since
SODECI estimated that it lost close to CFAF 2.2 billion between 1982 and 1987 (about
10% of its  1987 revenues) maintaining and operating rural water points, this benefited
SODECI greatly. 46 International donors also pressured the government to relieve SODECI
of  its  responsibility for  rural water points  since they were  unhappy with  SODECI's
performance.  A survey in  1986 of the 13,500 rural water points, performed by BNEDT,
found that about half were not functioning.
Incentives.  Another change was that  'take or pay'  provisions were eliminated
from the new contract. Before reform, SODECI's remuneration had been based upon the
Direction de l'Eau's  forecasts of water sales and, therefore, when actual sales had been
lower than projected, such as during the crisis, SODECI was entitled to compensation.
World Bank (1990, p. 21) estimated that US$11 million had to be paid to SODECI due to
the 'take or pay'  provisions before reform. In part, the threat of bidding seems to have
induced SODECI to agree to this change. SODECI's compensation is now based upon
actual collections.  Since SODECI also effectively controlled the portion of the tariff that
was paid to the FDE for investment, this arrangement maintained SODECI's incentive to
collect and bill existing customers and to connect new customers.
This intricacy of responsibilities among several public agencies and the private
operator resulted in shifting responsibilities and some confusion over the roles of these
46According  to World Bank (1990), SODECI estimated that its losses between 1982 and 1987 were
close to CFAF 2.2 billion ($6.3 million at 1987 exchange rates). In comparison, SODECI's total revenues in
1987 were about CFAF 28.2 billion.
29agencies.  The lack of clear rules for conflict resolution created a vacuum that increased
SODECI's discretionary power.  Binding rules that usually accompany a lease contract
(e.g., rules regarding investments) were difficult to implement and gave way to conflicts
between ministries, relaxing the constraints that the contract formally imposed on the
operator. This severely hampers reform and increases the risk that the private operator will
capture rents.
VI  Effect of Reform on Sector Performance
Notwithstanding  institutional problems  and  difficulties due  to  the  ambiguous
contractual arrangement, the urban water sector continued to perform impressively in the
1990s.  Although the  system was already functioning well, the  1988 reform and  the
subsequent  adjustments  managed  to  reverse  some  of  the  problems  related  to  the
macroeconomic crisis, while maintaining most other performance measures.  In particular,
prices fell in real terms and, despite a drop in investment expenditures when the system
became self-financing, the coverage rate in Abidjan improved.  Some problems, however,
remain-in  particular, the tariff failed to provide adequate resources to finance investment
and non-payment by the public sector became a serious problem.
The reform also demonstrated  the strength of the contractual arrangement. Despite
the adverse conditions under which the reform was implemented, the arrangement  per se
was  not  questioned.  Safeguards were  considered  strong  enough  to  guarantee the
sustainability of the system, and, although the credibility of the Government might have
been shaken, it was not perceived as a threat to the contract.  In fact, the arrangement's
ability to absorb major shocks reinforced the idea that the system would be a good model
for developing countries inside and outside the region. In this section of the paper, we
carefully evaluate the recent performance of the system. 4"  Throughout the section, we will
mainly focus on those areas where reform affected sector performance.
VI.1  Continued Strong Performance
As discussed in Section II, SODECI was already performing well prior to reform.
Many  performance  measures-UFW,  water  quality,  productivity,  and  billing  and
collection-continued  to perform well following reform.  In this subsection, we briefly
discuss these measures, noting how the new contract effected them.
47Our case  study  focuses  on Abidjan,  which  accounts  for about  68 % of the water  produced  by
SODECI.  Many  data,  including  on number  of employees,  is not available  by city. We try to present  data for
Abidjan  as much as possible.  The situation  in secondary  cities  is usually  not as favorable  as the situation  in
Abidjan,  introducing  a bias in our evaluation  of Abidjan.
30UFW  and  water  quality.  UFW  remained low  following  the  1988 reform,
remaining between 15 and 20% over the post-reform period. Although the quality control
process is relatively complex, and data is sometimes inconsistent, water quality also does
not appear to be a major problem.  Under the contract, SODECI is required to meet the
World Health Organization's (WHO's) water standards and according to SODECI close to
99% of its water met these standards in 1997 (World Bank, 1999). This is confirmed by a
1996 study, based on data collected from January 1993 to December 1995, showing that
water quality in Abidjan basically meets these standards (Balla, 1996).48
Productivity.  The steady improvement in  productivity that was evident before
1988 continued after reform (see Figure 4).  In addition, when the new  contract was
implemented, SODECI reduced its workforce from 1665 employees to  1349 employees,
resulting in an additional one-time improvement.  In part, this was due to the change in
SODECI's responsibilities under the new contract-86  employees were laid off due  to
suspension of SODECI's involvement in rural water supply.  However, presumably in
response to the lower compensation under the new contract, 164 additional employees
were laid off and 66 positions that were vacated by retirements, dismissals, resignations
and deaths were not filled.  By the end of 1996, there were 3.8 employees per thousand
connections (1294 employees for 344,855 connections nationwide), which is very good by
regional, or even international, standards.  In comparison, SEEG and SONEG in Guinea
had around seventeen employees per 1000 connections and SDE in Senegal had around six
employees per 1000 connections in mid-1997. 49 SODECI has also continued to decrease
the number of expatriate employees-from  nineteen in 1987 to seven in 1996.
Commercial performance.  Metering, which was close to  100%  before reform,
remained at this level following reform. In addition, as demonstrated by the continued low
levels of UFW, the billing rate also remained high.  Although the private collection rate
was good before reform, the ratio of accounts receivable to total sales for the private sector
improved after reform, falling from 7 months in  1987 to under 4 months by  1996 (see
Figure 12).  Indeed, SODECI reports that its collection rate from the private sector (i.e.,
amount collected divided by amount billed) was about 97-98% (SAUR, 1997).  Reform
improved SODECI's incentives to collect in two ways.  First, before reform, SODECI's
compensation was based upon the DE's projections of total sales, not on actual sales.  After
reform, SODECI's compensation was based directly upon collections.  Second, by self-
financing investment from the water tariff rather than through government borrowing and
48 The equipment in some neighborhoods, including  many of the poorest (e.g., Plateau, Adjame,
Anoukoua-Koute, Riviera Nord), is less adequate.
49Outsourcing is marginal and has not changed significantly over the period studied. According to
SODECI, it represents about 10% of tumover and is mostly related to services such as cleaning and security
(Meeting with B.A. Ebah, 06/05/1998).
31subsidies, system expansion started to  depend directly upon  SODECI's success with
collecting.  Since SODECI effectively controlled the Fond de Developpement de l'Eau
(FDE) this effect was magnified.
Sewerage.  As in the past, the sewerage sector was not included in the 1988 sector
reform.  However, over this  period,  the World Bank  did  finance a  large  sewerage
expansion project that connected 174,000 additional Abidjan inhabitants (World Bank,
1996). In addition, an ocean outfall pipe was constructed, which will mean that sewerage
from  the  system  will  no  longer be  dumped  into the  lagoon. 50 When  SODECI's
management contract for operation and (limited) maintenance of the sewerage system
expired in  1987, it was put  out for tender.  Although SODECI won the bid, bidding
resulted in a 35% reduction in SODECI's compensation. When SODECI stopped passing
the  rental  fee to  the  FNE in  1992, the  government was  unable to  pay  SODECI's
management fee, which was paid from FNE resources.  SODECI, however, continued to
perform its responsibilities. Although the contract expired in 1997, the government was
still negotiating a new lease contract for sector operations and maintenance  with SODECI
in mid-1999.
VI.2  The Effect of Reform on Coverage  and Prices
System expansion. The number of connections in Abidjan increased from 105,806
to  179,202 between 1988 and 1996.  Figure 9 shows an estimate of the connection rate
assuming 13.5 people per connection. 5' As noted earlier, the slow expansion of the system,
combined with the fast growth of the city, led to a decline in coverage in the period before
reform.  After the reform, this trend reversed and coverage improved. The improvement
accelerated in  the mid-1990s, following the devaluation of  the  CFA  Franc  and  the
subsequent recovery of the Ivoirian economy.
50However,  waste  from  non-comnected  industrial  plants  and  households  might  still  end  up in the lagoon.
SI SODECI  estimates  that  between  12  and 15  persons,  on average,  use each  connection.  Note  that  the
pattern  is similar  assuming  other  numbers  of  people  per connection,  although  the actual  numbers.
32The  increase  in  coverage
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Figure 9: Estimated Connection  Rate in Abidjan  1992  (World  Bank,  1993).
However,  the  reversal  also
Note:  Assumes  13.5  people  per connection  (SODECI  officials  refet  the  fatthtal  all
estimated  between  12-15  people  per connection).  reflects the fact that almost  all
Source: Connections  (SODECI);  Population (World Bank,  investment  between  1988  and
1998).  1998  was  in  the  distribution
network, primarily financing social connections for the low-income  population. There was
no significant investment in production for over ten years (e.g., no new boreholes were
drilled) and, consequently, according to SODECI, the system was operating at over 90% of
total capacity by 1998 (field interviews in 1997 and 1998). Since then, SODECI has used
a loan from the CFD to finance the construction of new facilities in Abidjan (World Bank,
1999).
The faster increase in the number of connections might partly be because SODECI
was more efficient than the Direction de l'Eau  was.  However, other explanatory factors
related to the design of the contract might also explain this.  First, SODECI has greater
incentives to connect new customers, rather than invest in other facilities, because this has
a direct effect on its revenues. Consequently, it has operated production facilities close to
capacity.  Second, under the contract, SODECI has to go through a competitive  bid process
for large investments (over CFAF 120,000), but can implement small investments (e.g.,
new connections) without any bidding.  This gives SODECI, which received 18% of
revenues from investment related activities in 1996 (SODECI 1996), an incentive to focus
on small investments, such as new connections, as much as possible.  Third, although the
tariff system, under which small customers  who consume little water pay lower tariffs than
customers who consume more, might seem to discourage SODECI from connecting small
customers, this  does not  seem to be  a major problem.  In large part, this  is probably
because SODECI's compensation remains about the same at all levels of consumption.
Although the 'social tariff  is CFAF 184/m 3, while the 'industrial tariff  is CFAF 532/m 3,
SODECI's remuneration is CFAF 144/m 3 for the 'social tariff' and only CFAF 198/m 3 for
the 'industrial tariff.  In contrast, the government fumds  (the FNE and FDE) receive far
33more revenue from the industrial tariff (CFAF 312/m 3 compared to CFAF 24/m 3 from the
social tariff). 52 Finally, it appears that SODECI might have concentrated relatively more
investment in Abidjan and less in secondary centers than the public agencies did before
reform.  Although the average growth of connections in Abidjan increased from 4.2% in
1980-88 to 6.6% in 1988-96, the average growth in secondary centers fell from 8.3% in
1980-88 to 5.5% in 1988-96. Since the marginal cost of water is lower in Abidjan than in
secondary centers, directing investment towards the capital would make  sense from a
commercial  standpoint.
Prices.  As noted in the previous section, the re-negotiation of the concession
contract in 1988 led to a significant  reduction in tariff rates, especially for large users. The
'domestic' tariff was reduced by 20% and the 'industrial' tariff was reduced by 23% (see
Table 1).  Since then prices have continued to  fall.  In field interviews, most Ivoirian
consumers seem to accept prices in the mid-1990s-an  additional strong indication of the
acceptance is that SODECI reported a private collection rate of 97-98% in 1997 (SAUR,
1997). In 1997, the average price of water was US $0.54/m 3 (CFA Fr 323.5), compared to
pre-reform average price of US$0.85/m 3 (CFA Fr 296).53
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Figure  10:  Tariff  levels  in Real  1990  CFAF  Francs  six months according to the
formula and  they were  left
52  VAT is CFAF 16/m 3 and CFAF 22/m 3 for the social and industrial  tariffs respectively.
5 Access  charges  for small  consumers  are also  subsidized-there  is no charge  for connection  pipes  less
than 15rmm  in diameter for private non-commercial  connections. Low income consumers do have to pay
CFA Fr 6,934 for installation of a meter, CFA FR 2,080 for registering and pay CFA FR 16,500 in advance
for water consumption. In contrast, large consumers (with access pipes between 20 and 40mm in diameter)
have to pay, on average, CFA Fr 90,000 for connection pipes and additional charges for meters and advances
for future consumption. The additional charges  vary from between CFA Fr 60,177 for pipes 20mmn  in
diameter to 346,480 for pipes 40mm in diameter.
34unchanged at the first five-year review (in 1993). There have been, however, several ad-
hoc adjustments.  In 1990, as a condition for the release of the second tranche of a World
Bank loan, the industrial tariff was reduced from CFAF 412 to CFAF 350.  In addition,
since the  devaluation of  the  CFA Franc  significantly increased SODECI's  costs  for
imported goods, a tariff increase was negotiated following the devaluation in December
1993 (see Table 1)  Since it would have been difficult for political reasons to adjust prices
the full 25% that would have been needed to fully compensate SODECI, the adjustment
was only partial.  However, after further negotiations and in return for a loan from the
Caisse Frangaise de Developpement  (CFD), the government agreed to an additional price
increase in May 1996 (see Table 1).
Despite  the  price  increases,
,  5.0  - SODECI's  profits,  after  an
4.0  initial  drop  at  the  time  of
to°  3  0  /  reform  appear  to  have
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Figure  11:  Net Profit  of SODECI  (millions  of 1996  US$)  intermediate  inputs) fell from
close to  CFAF  17,668 million
to CFAF 15,662 in 1990 prices. This occurred despite a 30% increase in water production,
from 90  billion m
3 in  1987 to  118 billion  m
3 in  1996.  Although  expenditures on
intermediate inputs  remained at about  CFAF  12,300 million  (in  1990 prices),  labor
expenses fell 36% from CFAF 5,329 million to CFAF 3,369 million (in 1990 prices).
VI.3  Challenges that Remain
Non-payment by the public sector.  Although non-payment by the public sector
became a problem before reform, public sector arrears continued to grow and, by 1994,
they were equal to  over five and a half years of public sector sales  (see Figure  12).
Although there was a marked improvement after 1994, this is primarily due to a loan that
the Caisse FranVaise  de Developpement gave the Ivoirian government to pay its water bill.
One of the main reasons for the public sector's poor performance record is that SODECI is
unable to cut off public sector entities for non-payment. Consequently, when public sector
entities do not pay, SODECI can do little about it.
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Source: SODECI.  debt service.  By the end of
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had reached CFAF 23 billion ($73 million).  In January 1992, SODECI applied to the
Prime Minister's Office for, and was granted, a waiver from paying the 'rental fee' to the
FNE.  SODECI resumed payments in  1995, when the government started to repay its
arrears to SODECI (see Figure 12).  In other terms, SODECI received some protection
from non-payment of their bills by governmental bureaus and public agencies, with the
government transferring the burden to the agencies in  charge of investment and debt
service, leading to tension with the Caisse Autonome d'Amortissement (CAA).
Sustainability of  investment.  Although the private  operator managed to  keep
increasing connections, it did this by neglecting other types of investment. Consequently,
production was hitting capacity limits by the end of 1997. It now seems unlikely that the
rental fee will provide sufficient funds for investment and future investment will probably
require  financing from  additional borrowing.  The  fiscal crisis  has  meant  that  the
Government is unable, or unwilling, to finance system expansion (and has even delayed
paying its  own bills-see  Figure 12).  However, SODECI can not  borrow to  finance
investment under  the current contract.  A  special arrangement, reached between the
Government and the  Caisse FranVaise de D&veloppement  (CFD) in  1996, allowed an
"exception" to this general rule.  Conditional on a price adjustment and the payment of
overdue public sector  bills, the CFD loaned the government  CFAF 12 billion and provided
an additional CFAF 4.2 billion loan to SODECI for investment. About half of the loan was
for new production units and about half is for social connections. However, the loans will
be  serviced through the  Fond  de  Developpement de  l'Eau,  making  the  government
36ultimately responsible for repayment. Consequently,  although SODECI does not bear any
risk, it will have direct access to the investment funds and will not have to compete for
works contracts.
Cost plus price system.  In practice, the decline in real tariffs does not appear to
have had a large impact on SODECI's profits.  Consequently, it seems possible that the
contractual arrangement suffered from  the usual bias  of a  cost-plus system  (i.e., the
operator had little incentive to reveal cost information to the regulator or to reduce costs).
In theory, this should be mitigated by the fact that prices are set based upon expected costs,
not actual costs.  Since prices are supposed to be set for five-year periods, SODECI could
keep any additional cost savings it implements over this period until the next five-year
review.  However, in practice, prices have not been adjusted according to the contract-
renegotiations have been ad-hoc, major renegotiations have not occurred every five years,
and the six-month adjustment formula has not been applied. Since the operator could lose
cost savings at any point through ad-hoc adjustments (i.e., not on a five-year schedule), the
private operator's incentives  to cut costs have been reduced.
VII  Lessons from a Stylized Case
In the previous section, we provided evidence that supports the view that the 1988
reform was largely successful.  The strong performance  of the sector was maintained and
even improved in several important ways, despite the continuing economic crisis and the
large increase in population.  Given the difficult environment in CMte  d'Ivoire during the
1980s and  1990s, the main question is why has this system been so successful?  Is the
contractual arrangement  particularly well designed  or is success due to institutional factors
specific to CMte  d'Ivoire?  Our tentative answer is that the institutional endowment, with its
long standing acceptance of private sector participation and the guarantees it provided to
investors, has allowed a well-designed system to function. The good fit between stable
institutional rules providing guarantees to the operator and a contract providing adequate
incentives  is likely the foundation of this success.
Despite  this  positive assessment,  some problems  with  the  initial  contractual
arrangement  persisted after the reform. This report identifies at least five factors that have
hampered success and that may threaten the sector's long-run performance,  namely:
1.  The separation of sewerage and water supply, and the failure to expand the former.
2.  The ambiguous and constantly changing roles of different public agencies.
3.  The public sector's failure to pay its water bill, which has threatened  investment.
4.  The contract, which mixes aspects of concessions and leases, allowing the private
operator to perform most investment  without competition or financial risk.
375.  The government's failure to introduce competition in the sector and the effect that this
has had on the capacity of public agencies to collect relevant information from the
operator.
The first three points are mostly related to failures or problems in the institutional setting.
The last two concern the design of the contract. In this section of the paper, we discuss
these issues and suggest some ways to improve sector performance.
VIl.1  Institutional Bugs
The institutional  decision to  separate water  and  sewerage has  led to  uneven
subsector development.  While 80% of households in Abidjan had access to safe drinking
water by 1996, only about 35% of households had sewage connections, despite loans from
international lenders. Although the aquifer, which is located at a depth of over 60 feet and
is protected by a thick layer of clay, has not become polluted, the situation appears to be
getting worse. Judging from the record in water, increased private sector participation
would improve subsector development.
Regulation and monitoring of the private operator has been made more difficult by
the unclear and constantly changing roles of different public agencies.  Between 1987 and
1995, the  Direction  de  V'Eau  and  BNEDT  competed for  responsibility  over  sector
investment.  Although the situation was clarified with the May 1995 Convention, which
firmly established the leadership of the Direction de I 'Eau, the simultaneous creation of the
Haut  Conseil a 1'Hydraulique led to  the emergence of  a new, potentially  competing,
agency.  Disputes over bureaucratic territory have made the private operator's  position
difficult and have slowed the decision-making  process. Because of the resulting conflicts,
and because of the importance and influence of SODECI and its main shareholder (SAUR),
there is  a  strong incentive for the operator to  go  over these agencies directly to  the
President of the Republic.  Moreover, conflict between the agencies has meant that the
regulators have failed to develop coherent competencies and share information.  This, in
turn, has increased information asymmetries  and hurt the quality of regulation.
A third problem, rooted in the institutional environment,  is the government's failure
to pay its water bill. This restricted funds at the time when the system was shifting towards
self-financing investment and led SODECI to withhold funds for debt service. Although a
loan from the Caisse Fran9aise de Developpement reduced this problem significantly in
1996, unless public sector discipline improves, it could easily occur again.  Allowing the
private operator to cut off public sector agencies that fail to pay their bills is certainly
useful.  However, private operators,  which remain heavily dependent upon the govermment,
have often been unwilling to do this.  For example, in Guinea, the private operator has not
cut  off  any  central  government agencies  for  non-payment even though  the  contract
38explicitly allows it to do so (Menard and Clarke, 2000). In a country such as Cote d'Ivoire,
where recent price adjustments have been made through a process of negotiation, rather
than by following  strict formulas,  this could be a potential problem.
Several methods that have been tried in other sub-sectors might encourage greater
discipline.  First, international donors can provide, under some circumstances, guarantees
for government payment of utility bills.  This essentially shifts the risk of non-payment
onto international donors, who have greater leverage over the government.  Second, some
part of export revenues might be tied to government payment.  These methods are not,
however, perfect.  A private operator might be unwilling to call a guarantee for much the
same reasons that it is often unwilling to cut water off to a government agency. In the end,
the most important thing is for the governmnent  to recognize the effect that non-payment
has on sector development and to act accordingly.  This raises the difficult issue of building
government's credibility with regard to guaranteeing full property rights, including the
right for private operator to be paid.
VII.2  Contractual Failures: Lease versus Concession
The  fourth  problem  is  the  fundamental ambiguity of  a  contract that  mixes
characteristics of a lease and a concession.  Since the private operator does not bear any
investment-related risk, the arrangement is a lease in the terminology of this project (see
Menard and Shirley, 2000).  However, despite not bearing any investment-related risk,
SODECI plans and implements most investment. This has allowed SODECI to virtually
eliminate any competition over investment  projects, creating opportunities for SODECI to
act opportunistically and further aggravating  information  asymmetries.
As  well as affecting competition over investment, the contract has  also had  a
significant impact on the quantity of investment. Under the 1988 arrangement, SODECI
was not able to borrow to finance investment and was not responsible for debt service.
Since the fiscal crisis and the large increase in govermment  debt reduced the govermment's
willingness to  borrow, the only  funds available for investment were  those  generated
through water tariffs. Even if the government had continued to pay its water bill and the
crisis had not affected industrial consumption, it would have been difficult to finance all
investment needs in this way.  Although SODECI managed to increase both the number of
connections and  the coverage rate in  Abidjan, investment in  productive capacity was
ignored. Although recent loans from the CFD have recently allowed additional investment
in production facilities, this is likely to continue to be a problem in the future.
The Government's continuing financial difficulties make it unclear whether the
necessary financial resources should be raised through the Government,  by borrowing from
abroad, or by allowing (and encouraging) SODECI to obtain direct access to  financial
39markets. The final solution, which would pass investment risk to SODECI, would result in
the contract  becoming a true concession. As noted in the previous section, a recent loan by
the Caisse FranVaise de Developpement (CFD) is a step in this  direction, although it
partially protects SODECI against risks.  Considering  the stability of the Ivoirian regime
and the long tradition of private management of utilities, particularly in the water system,
and the country's  strong rating by private risk assessment agencies, passage to  a  full
concession may be both desirable and feasible.  But what are the respective merits and
limits of concession and lease in an environment  like that of Cote d'Ivoire?
The  fundamental advantage of  a  concession is  that  it  makes  the  firm  fully
responsible for investment, management and debt for the duration of the contract.  Since
profits depend upon its  capacity to collect bills, the operator has a  strong incentive to
extend the network and to meter and bill users.  However, unless certain conditions are
fulfilled, concessions can be inefficient.  First, the contract should be awarded through
competitive tender. However, the uncertainties associated with running a water utility in a
developing country mean that this is not always easy to do. 54 Further, competition is likely
to  be  even less effective for contract renewals, since the incumbent has a  significant
informational advantage.  In Africa, because of the small number of firms that have been
actively involved in the urban water sector, it is even more difficult to ensure that bidding
is  competitive.  Second, the  contractor's  obligations  (e.g.,  investment  and  network
development) should be well specified, and easy to implement and monitor.  Again, this
can be  difficult in  developing countries, since many  factors that  affect the  optimal
evolution of the system are unpredictable (e.g., unplanned urban developments).  Third,
because water systems are close to a natural monopoly, there is a risk that the operator
would continuously pressure for renegotiations, once the  contract has  been allocated.
Hence, dispute resolution mechanisms must be well defined and efficient, which requires
especially sophisticated and credible institutions.  Fourth, the regulator monitoring the
concession  needs to have access to, and the technical ability to assess, relevant information
(e.g., on costs and the maintenance of the system).  Therefore, the contract needs to have
adequate information revealing schemes and the regulator needs to have the technical and
managerial skills to assess this information. Fifth, the firm might overuse equipment and
under-invest in maintenance, particularly towards the end of the contract, if there is a risk
that it will not have the contract in the next period.  The only way to avoid this bias is to
have a credible and efficient regulator, with sufficient enforcement power.  This requires
highly qualified, and independent, civil servants. Finally, the most important problem is
that large fixed investments, which can not be re-deployed to other uses, are required.
These  investments are  risky  in  countries with  limited  capital markets  and  unstable
54 See  Menard  and  Clarke  (2000)  for  an example  of this.
40institutional environments.  Although, as  discussed earlier, Cote d'Ivoire  has  stronger
institutions than many other developing countries, many observers believed that the risks
were still too high to implement a full concession, especially since the contract includes
systems in secondary centers.
The main advantage  of a lease is that it is more attractive to private operators, who
might otherwise be reluctant to get involved in risky environments. If the contract is well
designed, (i.e., if there are adequate incentives to develop the water system and to perform
efficiently), private operators  might be able to significantly  improve the management of the
system. Adequate incentive schemes should base the operator's revenues on bills collected,
and should provide the operator with motivation to reduce unaccounted for water (UFW)
and to extend the network. If the firm can capture part of the benefits of cost reduction, the
contract might also encourage them to reduce costs. This is the solution adopted in Abidjan
and it surely explains part of the success of the contract.
However, there are also problems with lease contracts.  First, since the operator is
not responsible for investment, the incentive to overuse physical assets is particularly high.
Second, because firms are not responsible for, nor involved in, the management of the debt,
there is a bias towards investment.  This bias is aggravated by the affiliation that muany
large water companies have with construction  companies (e.g., SAUR is a subsidiary of the
construction group, BOUYGUES).  Third, unless the contract is very specific, since the
operator's income is based on bills collected, there is a strong incentive for the leasing
company to develop the network only in the most profitable areas.  If there are public
health externalities or equity issues, leases might result in under-investment, especially in
poor areas.  Requiring the operator to charge the same price throughout the country or
charge poor residents a lower 'social tariff' will magnify this risk.  Fourth, for the reasons
mentioned above, there is  a  risk that competition from bidding will be  very  limited,
especially for contract  renewals.
Several  factors alleviate the  difficulties listed for  both  concession and  lease
contracts.  First, since water systems rely on technologies that are well established, inputs
are easily identifiable and costs are easier to assess.  Therefore, a relatively competent
regulator can estimate the validity of claims made by the operator more easily than in other
infrastructure  sectors. For example, in C8te d'Ivoire, the experienced engineers at BNEDT
could  determine whether  the  operator needed  to  change a  pump  and,  based  upon
international prices, how much they should charge.  Second, since there are very  few
operators on  the international market for  water supply  services, and  they  are fierce
competitors, there are strong reputation effects.  If the operator wishes to expand, and to
gain other contracts elsewhere, they would want to avoid  problems with existing contracts.
41The last problem in Cote d'Ivoire, as in many other countries, is the failure to
introduce competition into the sector. There was no bidding for contract renewal in 1988.
Moreover, bidding has been eliminated  for most investment. Although the macroeconomic
problems meant  that most  new  investment was for  social connections, allowing the
operator almost exclusive access to the Fonds de Developpement de l'Eau is likely to
increase costs in favor of the operator. 55 Attempting  to increase competition for investment
could be accomplished by splitting the water system into autonomous subsystems for the
different cities and allow bidding over these investment  contracts.
In addition to foregoing the likely efficiency gains, the lack of competition also
makes it difficult to  assess whether water could be provided at lower cost.  Although
SODECI appears to  perform well  by  regional standards, the price  of  water is  high
compared to the prices observed in Latin America and Asia (see footnote 1).  Although
international comparisons are difficult due to both institutional and physical differences
between countries, this  suggests gains  might be  possible.  Because  SODECI has  a
monopoly on urban water distribution in CMte  d'Ivoire, there are no other companies to
compare its performance within CMte  d'Ivoire.  Splitting the contract into several separate
contracts for different cities would help to develop the bidding process and would allow
yardstick competition.
Yardstick competition allows the operator to cut its own costs, without affecting  the
revenues that it receives (i.e., the regulator bases the price that the operator charges on the
performance of other utilities). Although this is an attractive idea, it has proven difficult to
implement even in  developed countries (see Clarke, Cowan  and Zuluaga, 2000). For
example, in Cote d'Ivoire, Abidjan is very different from most other major cities.  It is far
larger than any other city, gets its water from an aquifer rather than a dammed river, and
receives more rain than cities in the interior of the country. Consequently, most estimates
of the long-run marginal cost of water are far lower for Abidjan than for smaller secondary
systems.  It  would  be  difficult, therefore,  to  split  the contract and  allow yardstick
competition, without abandoning  the government's commitment to having the same tariffs
throughout the country.
5  According  to our interviews,  the standard  procedures  in mid-1  998  were  the following.  For new
investments  (extensions  etc.),  SODECI  prepares  plans that  are thereafter  subrnitted  to the Direction  de  l 'Eau.
Once  approved,  these  plans  are either  realized  by SODECI  (if the amount  is less  than 120  million  CFA,
which  has  been  systematically  the case  recently)  or through  bidding  (if more  than 120  million  CFA),  under
the supervision  of the BNETD.  For maintenance  of the system  and  of related  equipment  (i.e.,  replacing  a
pump)  the Direction  de l 'Eau  assesses  whether  it is justified  and it approves  (or rejects)  SODECI's  proposal.
However,  this is often  an ex-post  formality  since  there  are  often  emergencies.  Finally,  the management  of
branchements sociaux is largely left to SODECI,  although the Direction de l 'Eau decides the criteria for
qualifying  for  the subsidized  connections.  The  Direction  de l 'Eau  checks  that  connections  have  actually
been  installed  and  that  the beneficiaries  meet  the criteria,  ex-post.
42Rather than introducing yardstick competition, another solution would be to set
prices based on a price cap system.  The system adopted in 1988 was a simple cost-plus
system, where SODECI negotiates tariff levels with the government every five years. 5"
Prices are determined based upon SODECI's costs and the amount necessary to cover
sector debt and to pay for required investment.  Since the cost plus system guarantees
profitability, the private operator has little incentive to reduce costs.  Moreover, cost-plus
systems raise well-known problems of information revealing scheme. There is, however,
some incentive provided by the regulator's oversight and the operator's desire to maintain
its long-term relationship with the government.
In contrast, under a price cap, since the operator can keep any cost-savings (for a
fixed period), it has  stronger incentives to  continuously improve its  competitiveness.
However, the system could be politically sensitive, since the regulator is not empowered to
cut prices during the period that the agreed price is in effect, even if the operator is making
large profits.  However, if the regulator does cut prices when the operator makes profits,
then the operator has less incentive to cut costs (i.e., it becomes a cost plus system).  A
price cap might also encourage the operator to develop the network only for the more
profitable sections of Abidjan and to avoid developing systems in poorer areas and in
secondary cities, since this would keep costs low.  Although the contract might try to
correct this in  other ways (e.g., specifying the number of new connections), this will
increase complexity and transactions costs. Further, the government's failure to follow the
tariff adjustment procedures specified in the current contract suggests that a change to a
price-cap system might  not be  credible, especially if  the government suspected that
SODECI was making high profits.
To conclude our discussion, there is no optimal contract; there are contracts that fit
more or less with the institutional endowments. In the case of Abidjan, the lease contract
with significant responsibilities for the operator with regard to the choice of investments
has  worked well. On the other hand,  there are many indications suggesting that the
operator, benefiting from a favorable environment  with the country's strong risk rating by
private agencies, should assume more financial risk.  Similarly, the high price of water in
Abidjan suggests that there is room for gains; the cost-plus system should be  revised
accordingly, in order to provide the operator more incentive to reduce both prices and
costs.
5 Negotiations can also occur at other times in extraordinary circumstances  (e.g., the devaluation of the
CFA Franc).
43VIII  Conclusion
This case substantiates two important hypotheses. First, in general, in the absence
of a change in the government's support base or a sector-specific crisis, a macroeconomic
crisis will not make substantial changes in a specific sector desirable.  The modest 1988
reform was motivated by a major economic crisis, which reduced the resources available
for investment.  However, the continued strong performance of private operator and the
absence of a significant sector specific crisis meant that the reform resulted in  minor
adjustments to the existing contract to improve specific aspects of sector performance,
rather than radical change.  The increased responsibility given to the private operator
following reform reflects that  the problems resulting  from the  crisis  were primarily
concentrated in the public sector entities involved in the sector.  Second, the case study
illustrates the importance of the long-run stability and credibility of the government with
respect to  the contract and  the  guarantees of  associated rights.  Continuity of  these
commitments made continued private sector participation  sustainable.
The reform has, in general, been successful, especially  when sector performance is
compared to the performance of systems in other cities in the region.  Coverage has been
maintained at a high level despite rapid population growth, water and service quality have
been very good and prices have declined in real terms. Although the success is partly due
to specific characteristics of the contract and to private sector participation in the sector,
other cities in developing  countries have adopted similar contracts, some with considerably
less success. 57
As  noted in  World Bank  (1999, p.30)  to  a  large  degree, SODECI and  the
government's  good relations have been based upon using negotiation and flexibility to
achieve outcomes that  are acceptable to  both parties rather than on  specific contract
provisions.  Indeed, some contract provisiorls have been ignored (e.g., the automatic six-
monthly adjustment of tariffs based upon a fixed formula). At a general level, success in
C6te d'Ivoire has been due to  the government's consistent support for private  sector
participation in the sector and the institutions that have guaranteed the property rights of
the operator. More specifically, the existence of strong micro-institutions with sufficient
human capital has allowed the government to supervise the private operator and monitor.
the contractual arrangement  well, at least by regional standards.
57  For example, see Menard and Clarke (2000), that discusses a similar lease contract in Guinea.
Although the lease contract in Guinea does differ in some ways from the contract in CMte  d'Ivoire, in both
positive and negative ways, it has proven to be considerably  less successful. In large part, this seems to be to
difference  in institutional  endowments  between the two countries.
44Nevertheless, our paper has identified some serious flaws in the arrangement. The
quality of information available on the private operator and investment-a  well-known
bias in cost-plus systems-has  been a  consistent problem.  Moreover, the contractual
arrangement adopted in  1988 gave the operator, SODECI, considerable influence over
investment decisions, without requiring it to bear related risks.  Another problem is that,
under the new arrangement, all aspects of competition were seriously weakened.  The
concession was not open to competitive bidding at the time of reform and SODECI has
managed to almost eliminate bidding for new investment.  Since bidding is one way to
reduce information asymmetries, and given that the information asymmetries between the
private operator and the regulating agency are very large, this has likely slowed sector
development.  Other aspects of the contractual arrangement have also had  a  negative
impact on the information available  to the public sector agencies. Unclear and overlapping
responsibilities for the two main public agencies involved in the sector, which appear to
have been  recently resolved, led to  an  extended power struggle.  Consequently, the
agencies failed to develop the relevant skills required to monitor the contract and failed to
fully coordinate their decisions and share infonnation.  This resulted in  an awkward
situation for the private operator and slowed sector  development.
In summary, sector performance in Abidjan has been impressive, due in no small
part to the strong performance of SODECI. This has been supported by the government's
commitment to private sector participation  and an institutional framework  that protects the
private  operator.  However, the resolution of some remaining problems could further
improve sector performance  and guarantee  these gains into the twenty-first century.
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